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ABSTRACT
 
A social analog of a short-delay conditioning paradigm in
 
Pavlovian learning was used to test predictions concerning
 
the influence of stimulus context on human judgments of
 
causality- The learning experiment was masked by describing
 
it as a study testing a computerized employee evaluation
 
system. Subjects were presented information about a
 
hypothetical worker and a fictitious company's level of
 
productivity representing a nine month period. Consistent
 
with contemporary conditioning models of associative
 
learning, the results indicated that subject judgments of
 
the worker's causal priority for the company productivity
 
effect progressively strengthened as a function of repeated
 
worker-productivity pairings. And, limits of this
 
acquisition effect of causal judgments were influenced by
 
the frequency with which the production goal was met in the
 
worker's absence. The problem of context effects in
 
supervisor—worker and therapist—client evaluations are
 
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
 
The effects of context on psychological processes is a
 
problem of fundamental importance in all major areas of
 
psychology. Figure and ground in perception, adaptation-

level in psychophysics, Lewin/s concept of life space and
 
stimulus selection in learning are only a few of the
 
examples of context effects. Despite the recognized
 
interest in context effects in social psychology, and in
 
psychology generally, scant attention has been devoted to
 
context effects in social causal judgments (attribution).
 
One of Heider's (1944) most celebrated insights captures
 
this neglect. He stated that although "changes in the
 
environment are almost always caused by acts of persons in
 
combination with other factors, the tendency exists to
 
ascribe the changes entirely to persons" (p.361).
 
Presently, attribution theory is an amorphous
 
collection of observations about naive causal inferences.
 
Cook and Campbell (1979) have pointed out that, "The
 
epistemology of causation....is at present in a productive
 
state of near chaos" (p.10). Despite nobel attempts by
 
social psychologists, Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley
 
(1972), to clarify the rules the average person uses to
 
infer the causes of observed behavior, attribution theories
 
are arguably in need of synthesis. The present study is
 
part of a series of research projects designed to
 
investigate human causal judgments from a contemporary
 
learning-theoretical perspective. Specifically, the
 
following research attempted to develop a Neo-Hullian
 
paradigm to generate and test predictions concerning the
 
influence of context on social causal judgments.
 
Social Psvcholoqv
 
Psychology is not alone in presenting an indistinct
 
view of causality. In philosophy, the meaning of causality
 
has been an issue of controversy for centuries (for a
 
review, see Bunge, 1979). The majority of contemporary
 
ideologies concerning causal judgment issues originated from
 
the seminal works of British associationist, David Hume.
 
Employing a highly deterministic associative process to
 
explain causal judgments, Hume (1739/1964) postulated
 
several rules; spatio-temporal contiguitv - the cause and
 
effect must be contiguous in time and space; temporal
 
prioritv - the cause must be prior to the effect; and
 
constant union - the cause and effect must occur together.
 
Also, Hume added a fourth rule: that the same cause always
 
produces the same effect and that the same effect never
 
arises but from the same cause.
 
Although generally credited to John Stuart Mill, Hume
 
pbstulated two final rules of inference concerning causal
 
judgment: similaritv - if several different objects produce
 
the same effect, it must be by means of some quality common
 
among them, and difference - the difference in the effects
 
of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular
 
in which they differ. The coordinated application of these
 
two rules also lends itself to later models of attribution
 
which investigated choosing among rival causes the one most
 
predictive of a particular effect (see Kelley, 1972;
 
Wasserman, 1990).
 
Critical realists (e.g., Harre, 1972) describe causal
 
perceptions as subjective constructions of the mind. They
 
argued that seeking causes and effects is an innate
 
tendency, and has an evolutionary adaptive role. Critical
 
Realists purport that although causal relationships exist
 
independent of our consciousness, perceptions do not. We
 
therefore focus on manipulative relations between cause (X)
 
and effect (Y) and use the information for survival-

Critical realists echo Aristotle's assumption that
 
observation in and of itself is not sufficient to understand
 
nature. They suggest that, in order to observe the
 
relationship between X and Y, variables must be manipulated
 
(i.e., causal inference results from actions). As a result,
 
experimentation is a natural outgrowth of our innate
 
tendency to search for causal laws.
 
Historical observations (e.g., Hume, 1739/1964; Mill,
 
1972) of causality suggest that the insights of the earliest
 
thinkers about behavior can importantly apprise and motivate
 
current research and theory in causal judgment. As a
 
result, psychologists within various research traditions
 
have focused on specific facets of causality which were
 
emphasized by different philosophers and made operational
 
tests of these concepts. For example, Einhorn and Hogarth
 
(1986) reported that, "workers in attribution theory have
 
tended to follow Kelley (1967) in emphasizing Mill's
 
criteria of concdmitant variation and the method of
 
differences; Michottes (1946) classic demonstrations of how
 
people perceive causes relies heavily on ideas advanced by
 
Hume; and Shultz's (1982) work has been influenced by Kant's
 
notions that causal relations are characterized by forces of
 
generative transmission between cause and effect" (p. 3).
 
The relevance of contextual factors in determining
 
probable cause has only recently developed in social
 
psychology (Einhofn & Hogarth, 1986). Previously, behavior
 
was generally seen as more salient than the situation,
 
exemplified by Heider's (1958) statement that "behavior
 
engulfs the field" (p. 1). Although attribution research is
 
quite diverse, much of it can be traced to the work of
 
Heider as operationalized by Jones and Davis (1965) and
 
Kelley (1967, 1972, 1973). Similar to the critical
 
realist's perspective, Heider's early work on phenomenal
 
causality (1944) emphasized the human motive to stabilize
 
the perceived environment by appropriate cause-effect
 
assignments. Heider suggested that people strive to bring
 
order and meaning to their world by determining the
 
attribution of intention, ability, and environmental
 
properties.
 
Specifically, Heider argued that perceivers seek the
 
invariances underlying behavior in order that people and the
 
environment appear more predictable. Consistent with
 
Heider's view, the learning-theoretical viewpoint of this
 
thesis is that "social effects or outcomes" will elicit
 
automaticalIv a search for causes and a generation of cause-

effect statements on the part of the observer (see Dickinson
 
& Balleine, 1994). We term this activity invariance seeking
 
action. and consider it to be analogous to an unconditioned
 
response (See Rule 3 below, p.18).
 
In an effort to make Heider's theory more amenable to
 
empirical test, Jones and Davis (1965) formulated the theory
 
of Gorrespondent inference which examined the relationship
 
between the effects of an action and the personal
 
disposition inferred by those effects. In particular, Jones
 
and Davis suggested that we pay more attention and infer
 
dispositional "cause" to those behaviors of others which are
 
freely chosen, produce noncommon effects, and are low in
 
social desirability. Jones and Davis argued that this
 
initial reaction creates a dispositional "perceptual anchor"
 
in the observer which is resistant to amelioration when
 
additional information concerning situational constraints
 
surrounding the behavior is provided. Similarly, empirical
 
evidence (e.g., Ajzen, 1971) demonstrated support for the
 
Jones and Davis theory of noncommon effects which suggested
 
that the fewer distinctive effects an actor has for an
 
action, the more informative is that action about
 
identifying dispositions of the actor.
 
Kelley (1973) examined Heider's suggestion that people
 
might employ a variant of Mill's method of difference when
 
choosing an actual cause from a large repertoire of
 
potential causes. Consistent with early Pavlovian
 
conditioning models which discussed contiguity of events,
 
Kelley developed a comprehensive model of causation which
 
described the covariation principle of attribution: "An
 
effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with
 
which over time it covaries" (p. 108). In other words, the
 
effect is attributed to that condition which is present when
 
the effect is present and which is absent when the effect is
 
absent (Kelley & Michela, 1980). Kelley explicitly
 
distinguished between two different cases of attribution
 
theory - one in which the observer has information from
 
multiple observations and one in which the attributor has
 
information from only a single observation. Contemporary
 
researchers also distinguish between what are termed
 
experienced and described causal situations. The
 
covariation principle as defined requires multiple
 
observations, experienced causal situations, or Bertrand
 
Russell's concept of "knowledge by acquaintance" (see
 
Shanks, 1991).
 
In addition, Kelley (1972) identified three
 
attributional criteria which employ the covariation
 
principle: consensus (the extent to which others react in
 
the same manner to a stimulus or event as the individual in
 
question); consistencv (the extent to which the individual
 
reacts to this same stimulus or event in the same way on
 
other occasions); and distinctiveness (the extent to which
 
the individual reacts in the same manner to other, different
 
stimuli or events). McArthur (1972) systematically varied
 
consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information
 
pertaining to a behavioral act (e.g., John laughs at the
 
comedian). Subjects were instructed to indicate the cause
 
they perceived as most plausible. Consistent with previous
 
trends in the literature (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1969), and
 
Heider/s insightful analysis, the results indicated that
 
observers tend to attribute behavior to dispositions rather
 
than context.
 
When multiple observations are not possible, however,
 
attribution for a single instance is presumed to follow
 
Kelley's (1972, 1973) principles of discounting and
 
augmenting, rather than the principle of covariation. The
 
discounting principle, according to Kelley (1973) holds that
 
"The role of a given cause in producing a given effect is
 
discounted if other plausible causes are also present" (p.
 
113). For example, in personnel assessment (the masking
 
task in this thesis) the evaluation of a specific worker's
 
effectiveness in contributing to a company's production
 
outcome will be discounted if other workers (i.e., plausible
 
causes) are present.
 
According to Kelley's (1973) theory of attribution,
 
causes can also be facilitative. Kelley's augmenting
 
principle suggests, "if for a given effect, both a plausible
 
inhibitory cause and a plausible facilitative cause are
 
present, the role of the facilitative cause in producing the
 
effect will be judged greater than if it alone were present
 
as a plausible cause for the effect" (p. ll4). in other
 
words, a cause can succeed in producing the behavior in the
 
face Of important barriers. For example, suppose Bill is a
 
worker at a company which in the past has not met its
 
production qudtas. Bill predicts the company will not meet
 
its productivity goal. The company hires a new employee,
 
Joe, to work with Bill and the productivity level of the
 
company increases. As a result, Joe's perceived
 
effectiveness as a contributor to the company meeting its
 
productivity goal, in the context of a worker Bill, who does
 
not predict meeting tho company goal, is expected to be
 
augmented.
 
Although, discussions of attribution do not often focus
 
on what Tolman and Brunswick (1935) called the "causal
 
texture of the environment," contemporary learning theory
 
has focused much attention on the topic of context in
 
conditioning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner &
 
Rescorla, 1972). And^ contemporary learning theorists
 
(e.g.. Alloy & Tabachanik, 1984; Gluck & Bower, 1988) have
 
suggested that human causal judgments closely parallel the
 
conditioned responses in animals in associative learning
 
studies (See Lovibond, 1988). Specifically, Rescorla (1988)
 
noted that "The CS/US relations required for conditioning
 
are very similar to those that a rational scientist would
 
demand to conclude that the CS is the cause of the US" (p.
 
340, see also Dickinson, 1980).
 
Contemporary learning theorists have also extended the
 
role of contiguity in causal judgments to include a
 
contingency mechanism (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Williams,
 
1994). Attribution research which has relied heavily on a
 
simple contiguity mechanism (Kelley's covariation
 
principle), may also benefit from this extension. We
 
suggest that contemporary learning theory may provide
 
valuable theoretical tools needed to extend our
 
understanding of human casual analysis.
 
Learning Psvchology
 
Our approach to examining cause-effect relationships is
 
to employ a number of learning-theoretical concepts. This
 
particular research strategy has developed an impressive
 
record with regard to the explanation of existing empirical
 
relationships and the generation of testable new
 
predictions. Previously, the most basic and well-studied
 
learning model has been Pavlovian conditioning. In
 
Pavlovian conditioning a previously neutral stimulus, the
 
conditioned stimulus (CS), is associated with a biologically
 
significant stimulus, the unconditional stimulus (US). As a
 
result of the pairings of the CS and US, the conditioned
 
stimulus (CS) comes to elicit a response, termed the
 
conditioned response (CR). Pavlov and other early learning
 
theorists (e.g., Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956) assumed that this
 
simple temporal contiguity or joint occurrence of a CS
 
(cause) and US (effect) was sufficient for associative
 
learning. Over the two past decades, however, it has become
 
apparent that conditioning is neither this simple nor this
 
mechanical. '
 
Conditioning is no longer seen as a low-level
 
mechanical process in which the control over a response is
 
passed from one stimulus to another. Drawing from the
 
associationist tradition in philosophy, conditioning is
 
viewed as the learning that results from exposure to
 
relations among events in the environment. The
 
insufficiency of contiguity for producing conditioning can
 
be illustrated by results that have been available for some
 
time. Rescorla (1968) examined the insufficiency of
 
contiguity for producing Pavlovian conditioning and
 
determined that it is the contingency between the CS and US
 
which allows conditioning to occur. Rescorla described
 
contingency as "the relative probability of occurrence of
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the US in the presence of the CS as contrasted with its
 
probability in the absence of the CS" (p.l).
 
Kamin (1969) in a critical investigation of
 
conditioning known as the "blocking effect" contributed
 
evidence for Rescorla's (1968) contingency principle. Kaitiin
 
demonstrated that conditioning to one element (X) of a
 
compound stimulus (AX) could be blocked by prior training to
 
the other element (A). For example, a light (A) was
 
conditioned to predict a shock, and then a compound stimulus
 
consisting of a light (A) and a tone (X) was paired with the
 
same level of shock. When the tone (X) was tested alone
 
conditioning to X was attenuated compared to the responses
 
to X in another group receiving onlv AX compound
 
conditioning trials (i.e., no prior experience with A). The
 
blocking effect demonstrated by Kamin's experiment
 
undermined the sufficiency of contiguity for associative
 
learning even though both groups received equal pairings of
 
light+ tone/shock.
 
According to simple contiguity both groups should have
 
responded similarly to the X stimulus. Hence, the
 
effectiveness of the shock US for producing associative
 
learning depended on the relationship between the tone CS
 
and the expected outcome (Kamin, 1969; Kremer, 1978;
 
Rescorla, 1968; Wagner, 1969). In Kamin's research the tone
 
was redundant relative to the light OS in predicting the
 
shock and therefore responding to the tone CS was reduced.
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Rescorla and Wagner advanced a distinct forinulation of this
 
general proposition (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner &
 
Rescorla, 1972).
 
As a result of the work described above, contemporary
 
learning literature reveals a lively interest in the impact
 
of context on conditioning. The issues raised by contextual
 
variation fall within a general class of problems termed
 
stimulus selection. Rudy and Wagner (1975) briefly describe
 
the stimulus selection problem as "one of specifying the
 
rules whereby a relationship will or will not appear to be
 
learned about depending upon the context of environmental
 
events in which it is embedded" (p. 270). For instance, if
 
the CS is a compound of two stimuli, and one;of them is more
 
salient or noticeable than the other, nearly all
 
conditioning which occurs may be controlled exclusively by
 
the more salient stimulus; the less salient stimulus may be
 
completely overshadowed. Overshadowing is another phenomena
 
that argues against the simple contiguity mechanism in
 
associative learning.
 
Another example of the stimulus selection problem is
 
inhibitory conditioning which occurs when a stimulus signals
 
the absence of the reinforcer (i.e., US). A conditioned
 
inhibitor is produced when one CS (A), is consistently
 
reinforced (+), and a compound containing A, and a second CS
 
(X) is consistently nonreinforced (-). As a result of such
 
training, X can be shown to possess inhibitory properties.
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That is, presenting X can reduce the level of responding to
 
another independently trained, excitatory stimulus (e.g.,
 
Bouton, 1994; Konorski, 1948; Pavlov, 1927). A series of
 
experiments strongly suggests that simple contiguity of the
 
CS and US fails to capture the relation required to produce
 
excitatory and inhibiting conditioning. In other words,
 
conditioning depends not simply on the contiguity between
 
the GS and US but rather on the information that the CS
 
provides about the US.
 
Contemporarv Learning Perspective
 
An interest in contextual variables, and their effect
 
on causal judgments, although not normally addressed in
 
terms of stimulus selection, has recently developed in
 
contemporary studies of causality judgments (Shanks &
 
Dickinson, 1987; Algom & Bizman, 1983; Alloy & Tabachnik,
 
1984; Gluck & Bower, 1988; Wasserman, 1990). Shanks and
 
Dickinson (1987), for example, echoed Hume's belief that, "a
 
causal judgment is seen as reflecting no more than the
 
strength of the relevant association between the mental
 
representations of the cause and effect, with the principles
 
governing such attributions being those of associative
 
learning" (p. 230). Hence, the impact of event
 
contingencies developed within conditioning research may
 
well illuminate the processes underlying human judgments of
 
causality.
 
Similar to other contemporary learning theorists (e.g.,
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Rescorla, 1968; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), Shanks and
 
Dickinson also suggested that contiguity alone does not
 
provide evidence about the necessity of a cause. They
 
argued that a simple contiguity-sensitive mechanism could
 
not answer the question, "Is the target cause necessary for
 
the action to occur?" Shanks and Dickinson reported that
 
contiguity mechanisms could not distinguish between pairings
 
in which the putative cause was imperative for the effect
 
from those in which the conjunction was fortuitous (illusory
 
correlation).
 
In an effort to demonstrate that causal judgments are
 
affected by the factors critical for the type of associative
 
learning seen in conditioning. Shanks and Dickinson arranged
 
contiguous pairings of events within different causal
 
backgrounds. Judgments based simply upon the number of
 
pairings were expected to yield the same rating for
 
effectiveness of the target cause. The first sequence was
 
considered a positive contingency between the action (CS)
 
and outcome (US), whereas the US occurred only in the
 
presence of the CS. In the second sequence, there was a
 
noncontingent relationship between the action and the
 
outcome, the US was just as likely to occur in the absence
 
of the CS as in its presence. The results indicated that
 
the higher the baserate of the US alone, the less
 
conditioning to the target stimulus occurred. In effect,
 
conditioning and therefore the judgments of cause, were
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sensitive to the baserate of US occurrence against which a
 
CS/US contiguity occurred.
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
 
In summary, several theoretical frameworks have been
 
postulated to explain human perception of causation (e.g.,
 
Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelly & Michela, 1980;
 
Michotte, 1963; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Wasserman, 1980).
 
Although the historical work of attribution theorists using
 
inferential or rule governed models is clearly
 
sophisticated, they do not yet contain a mechanism for
 
predicting and explaining social attributional contextual
 
phenomena (e.g., acquisition, blocking, contingency effects,
 
overshadowing). As a result, traditional attribution
 
research may be subject to limitations when explaining
 
cause-effect judgments. By employing a general programmatic
 
approach termed "extension of liberalized S—R theory" by
 
Neal Miller (1959), we offer a context sensitive theory of
 
social attribution modeled on Rescorla and Wagner (1972).
 
The Neo-Hullian theory developed by Rescorla and Wagner
 
powerfully addresses the stimulus selection problem in
 
learning research. Neo—Hullian theory has been developed
 
primarily to predict individual behavior in controlled
 
laboratory situations, howeyer, it has been extended to many
 
social processes with considerable success (e.g., Cottrell,
 
1968; Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985; Bollard &
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Miller, 1950; Lott & Lott, 1968; 1972; Steigleder, Weiss,
 
Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978; Zajonc, 1965). The context
 
sensitive theory developed here is designed to predict and
 
explain acquisition effects, contingency effects, and other
 
related contextual phenomena in attribution. Specifically,
 
the influence of a contingency mechanism for determining the
 
acquisition and strength of causality judgments in a common
 
social situation will be tested.
 
Technique of Theorv Construction
 
Through the use of analogy, a relatively well
 
understood conditioning paradigm will be used to guide the
 
investigation of a less well-understood research area (e.g.,
 
social causal judgments in context). In particular,
 
analogies will be drawn between contemporary associative
 
learning variables and the variables assumed to be important
 
in the development of social causal judgments. A dictionary
 
of analogies (Rules of Correspondence) relates the
 
independent and dependent variables of the model to the
 
corresponding (analogous) independent and dependent
 
variables of social attribution. Consistent with this
 
construction, the relations holding among the variables in
 
the conditioning model should, theoretically, hold among the
 
corresponding social attribution variables (Campbell, 1920;
 
Hesse, 1966, 1974, 1980; Masterman, 1980; Oppenheimer,
 
1956).
 
The Rules of Correspondence relating the variables in
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classical conditioning to the variables of social
 
attribution are given here and are numbered for later
 
reference. Corresponding to a conditioned stimulus (CS), or
 
antecedent stimulus, is a discriminable social stimulus,
 
such as a worker (Rule 1). Corresponding to an
 
unconditioned stimulus (US), or a consequent stimulus, is a
 
social stimulus, such as a fictional company's productivity
 
level, which elicits "invariance seeking action (ISA)" (Rule
 
2), and the ISA so elicited is analogous to an unconditioned
 
response (UR; Rule 3). The conditioned form of the OR
 
analog (speed, probability, or amplitude of "invariance
 
seeking action") corresponds to a conditioned response (CR;
 
Rule 4). The number of CS-US pairings (reinforced trials)
 
corresponds to the number of CS analog-US analog pairings,
 
such as the number of times a worker is paired with a
 
company's productivity goal being met (Rule 5). Rule 5
 
constitutes an "invariance seeking action" acquisition
 
trial. A trial on which a worker is not followed by
 
information regarding a company meeting its productivity
 
goal represents a CS alone or extinction trial (Rule 6).
 
Presenting US-analogs in the absence of CS-analogs
 
constitutes a US alone trial, such as the company meeting
 
its productivity goal when a specific worker was not present
 
(Rule 7). Corresponding to a reinforced compound CS trial
 
is a ISA trial where two or more social stimuli, such as'two
 
workers, are jointly paired with the company meeting its
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productivity goal (Rule 8). Corresponding to CS saliency is
 
the saliency or vividness of the CS analog (Rule 9). The
 
power of a Social stimulus, such as the level of company ­
productivity, to elicit "invarianCe seeking action"
 
corresponds to the intensity or strength of the US (Rule
 
10).
 
Although the rules developed above are illustrative,
 
rather than exhaustive, they are sufficiently detailed to
 
permit the generation of acquisition and contingency effect
 
hypotheses using classical conditioning as a model.
 
Hvpotheses
 
Acquisition Effects. In classical conditioning acquisition
 
of a conditioned response is an increasing function of the
 
number of CS-US pairings, or reinforced trials. Hence, we
 
predict, as a function of repeated pairings of a worker, Joe
 
(CS analog) and company productivity information (US analog)
 
judgments of Joe as a cause of the company meeting its
 
productivity goal (CR analogs ISA's) will progressively
 
strengthen (Rules 1^5).
 
Continqencv Effects. The contingency effects noted above
 
suggest that causal judgments will not simply be a function
 
of the frequency of CS-US analog presentations. Rather they
 
are expected to be influenced by how often the worker and
 
productivity information appear together and how often the
 
productivity information occurs in the absence of the
 
worker. Based upon contemporary learning research, and the
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Rules of correspondence listed above, we predict that the
 
limits of the above stated acquisition effect will be
 
determined by the frequency with which the productivity
 
information is provided without the worker present (Rule 7).
 
More specifically^ we predict a neqative relationship
 
between the number of times the productivity goal is met in
 
the absence of the worker, and the strength of causal
 
judgments to the worker.
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GENERAL METHOD
 
Subjects
 
Subjects were 40 males and 40 females ranging in age
 
from 18 to 52 who were recruited from courses offered at
 
California State University. All subjects were naive with
 
respect to the experimental task and were randomly assigned
 
to one of four experimental conditions. All subjects were
 
treated in accordance with the ethical principles of the
 
American Psychological Association. Five female and two
 
male: experimenters, all members of the Social Learning
 
Research Group, conducted the experiment.
 
Experimental Design
 
In classical conditioning a discriminable antecedent
 
stimulus CS, is paired with a discriminable consequent
 
stimulus, US. Similarly, in the present study the CS was a
 
fictional part-time worker, named Joe, and the US was the
 
productivity information of a fictional company where Joe
 
worked. The primary independent variable was the US alone
 
baserate, or number of times the US (productivity
 
information) appeared in the absence of the CS (Joe). A
 
repeated variable, number of acquisition trials, constituted
 
the second independent variable. The experimental design
 
can be described as a 4 x 18 (Groups x Trials) design. The
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subjects' strength of causal judgments (i.e., invariance
 
seeking action) defined the primary dependent variable. A
 
secondary dependent variable was the subjects' ratings of
 
confidence in their causal judgments.
 
Masking Task
 
The learning experiment was masked by describing it as a
 
study testing a computerized Employee Evaluation System.
 
This procedure allowed for repeatedly pairing a worker with
 
information about the company's productivity level. The
 
instructions indicated that, "In this experiment we are
 
interested in testing a computerized employee evaluation
 
system. Your cooperation is necessary for testing the
 
usefulness of this automated program. In order to carefully
 
test the effectiveness of the system, it will be necessary
 
for you to assume the role of a production supervisor in a
 
large company." Further instructions indicated that, "Joe
 
is a college student who is available for part-time
 
employment. It is important to evaluate him carefully
 
because he will be considered for full-time employment upon
 
graduation." (see Appendix A for the complete instructions.)
 
Apparatus and Materials
 
Previous research (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) suggested
 
that computer presentation of stimuli is an effective way to
 
study the learning of causal relationships. Therefore, all
 
communication between researcher and participant occurred
 
via an IBM 360 PC subject module. The computer program,
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Micro Experimental Language (MEL) version 120, served to
 
present a series of visual cues and response manipulanda.
 
The MEL program controlled presentation of the instructions,
 
the CS (Joe) and the US (company productivity information),
 
and the employee evaluation items. The timing of all
 
stimulus material was controlled automatically and remained
 
constant for each subject.
 
The subject module included a key pad numbered 0 to 100
 
which allowed the subject to respond to a three-item
 
Employee Evaluation Scale (EES) designed to measure the
 
worker's effectiveness following presentation of the CS and
 
the US analogs. Subjects were asked to rate the
 
effectiveness of the worker Joe in causing the company's
 
productivity level, and also rate their confidence in their
 
causality judgments. The two questions were anchored with
 
the phrases; totallv ineffective and totallv effective, and
 
no confidence and complete confidence, respectively. In
 
addition, the third item on the EES required subjects to
 
indicate Joe's chances for becoming a permanent employee.
 
The question was included to sustain the masking task and
 
was anchored with the phrase no chance and very good chance.
 
The subject responses to item 3 were not included in the
 
analysis. All subjects were asked to respond to the three-

item EES using a 0 to 100 point scale where lower scores
 
equaled lower response strength.
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Procedure
 
Upon entering the lab subjects were asked to read and
 
sign a consent form (See Appendix B). After the subject
 
consented to participate, the experimenter sat the subject
 
in front of the subject module and started the MEL program.
 
Subjects received instructions via computer monitor for 60
 
seconds. Following the instructions Joe, presented as a
 
computer generated drawing (See Appendix D), appeared for 5
 
seconds on the left side of the computer monitor. After the
 
5 second period, a graph depicting the company's
 
productivity information appeared on the right side of the
 
computer monitor. After both the CS and the US had been
 
visible for an additional 10 seconds, the entire computer
 
monitor went blank and item one from the EES appeared for 17
 
seconds. This general procedure is analogous to delay
 
conditioning in Pavlovian learning. Subjects were asked to
 
respond to item one using a 0-100 point scale. Regardless
 
of the speed in which subjects entered their response the
 
item remained illuminated on the screen for a full 17
 
seconds. Following the 17 second time period the entire
 
screen went blank and item two appeared, again for 17
 
seconds. This sequence was repeated for item three.
 
Following the subject's response to item three, the program
 
recycled to a picture of the worker, Joe. The cycle was
 
repeated for a total of 18 trials. After the subjects
 
completed 18 cycles they were debriefed (See Appendix C) and
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were provided the opportunity to have any questions
 
answered.
 
From the subjeets' perspective the experiment
 
progressed as a continuous employee evaluation cycle.
 
Conceptually, across eighteen trials subjects received a
 
combination of CS/US (acquisition) trials, no CS/US (US
 
alone) trials, and no CS/no US (control) trials. Subjects
 
in all four groups viewed nine pairings of Joe and the
 
companVs productivitv information. The four groups were
 
Distinguished by changes in the US alone baserate (Stimulus
 
materials for all 4 groups are presented in Appendix D).
 
Noncontinaencv fNCV Group. The purpose of the NO Group
 
was to establish a noncontingent relationship between the CS
 
and the US. That is, the US was just as likely to occur in
 
the absence of the CS as in its presence. In addition to
 
the nine acquisition trials. subjects received nine US alone
 
trials. Hence, on nine of the trials subjects received
 
information about the company productivity in the absence of
 
the worker. Followihg each trial, NC Group subjects
 
responded to the EES described above. The items included,
 
"Given all of the information you have received, on the
 
scale below indicate the extent to which Joe is an effective
 
employee in causing the company's level of productivity",
 
"How confident are you about your judgment of Joe's being
 
effective in causing the company's level of productivity",
 
and "Given all of the information you have received, on the
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scale below indicate Joe's overall potential for becoming a
 
permanent employee."
 
Group 2. The purpose of Group 2 was to vary the
 
baserate of US alone trials against which a CS/US contiguity
 
occurred. Subjects followed the same general procedure as
 
subjects in the NC Group except that, in addition to the
 
nine acquisition trials, subjects were presented just six US
 
alone trials. Also, in order to balance the number of
 
trials received by the subjects, three control trials were
 
included to make the total equal 18 for each group.
 
Subjects evaluated Joe on the EES following each trial as in
 
the NC Group.
 
Group 3. The purpose of Group 3 was to. vary the
 
baserate of US alone trials against which a CS/US contiguity
 
occurred. Subjects followed the same general procedure as
 
subjects in the NC Group except that, in addition to the
 
nine acquisition trials, subjects were presented with only
 
three US alone trials, and six control trials. Subjects
 
evaluated Joe on the EES following each trial as in the NC
 
Group.
 
Positive Continqencv fPCV Group. The purpose of the PC
 
Group was to establish a positive contingency between the CS
 
and US. That is, the CS occurred only in the presence of
 
the US. Subjects followed the same general procedure as
 
subjects in the NC Group except that in addition to the nine
 
acquisition trials, subjects were ptesented with nine
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control trials. Hence, the subjects never received
 
information about the company productivity alone. Subjects
 
evaluated Joe on the EES after each trial as in the NC
 
Group. '
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RESULTS
 
The analyses focused on the subjects' ratings of causal
 
strength to the worker, Joe, and the subjects' confidence in
 
their causal judgments. Both dependent variables used to
 
test the hypothesis were measured following each of the 9
 
acguisition trials. The means and standard deviations for
 
the subjects' estimates of cause are presented in Table 1.
 
A simple repeated measures model and a Groups by Trials
 
model was used to test predictions regarding acguisition
 
effects and contingency effects, respectively.
 
Acquisition
 
An inspection of the causal strength means presented in
 
Figure 1 indicates that the performance in Group 2 and Group
 
3, although hypothesized to be intermediate, revealed no
 
predicted effects. It is evident that further analysis of
 
those two particular groups would not prove meaningful in
 
terms of testing the proposed hypotheses. Mean casual
 
strength ratings between Groups NC and PC, however, where
 
differences were expected to be maximized, evidenced a
 
predictable outcome. Therefore, all analyses were performed
 
on data from Groups NC and PC across 9 trials.
 
To clarify the visual presentation of the acguisition
 
effects a baseline was established using the subjects' mean
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Table 1 
Descriptive Sbabistics for the Independent and the 
Dependent Variables. 
Groups Trials 
Noncontingent 
M 
SD 
(1) 
61.5 
18.1 
(2) 
67.8 
11.5 
(3) 
66.9 
15.8 
(4) 
66.7 
16.8 
(5) 
63.9 
19.9 
Group 2 
M 
SD 
66.3 
15.2 
67.8 
22.7 
70.3 
21.9 
68.5 
21.1 
66.7 
22.6 
Group 3 
M 
SD 
61.9 
21.9 
62.3 
21.9 
69.4 
20.1 
66.3 
17.7 
62.1 
23.9 
Positive Contingency 
M 68.2 
SD 18.6 
'75.0 
15.2 
75.4 
17.8 
79.7 
14.3 
78.9 
15.9 
Note: N = 20 
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Table 1 (cont'd)
 
Groups 

(6)
 
Noncontingent
 
M 61.6
 
SD 21.5
 
Group 2
 
M 61.7
 
SD 25.5
 
Group 3
 
M 56.1
 
SD 27.3
 
Positive Contingency
 
M 76.5
 
SD 15.4
 
Note: N = 20
 
Trials 
(7) (8) (9) 
64.4 56.1 59.0 
18.4 23.9 26.6 
60.45 55.5 57.2 
28.3 29.8 28.4 
62.1 60.4 61.0 
26.7 27.7 25.6 
78.0 . 80.0 78.5 
15.2 16.1 15.9 
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Figure 1
 
Acquisition Curves of Causal Judcrments for Each Experimental
 
Group
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causal strength rating on Trial 1 (see Figure 2).
 
Inspection of overall mean differences from baseline for the
 
remaining 8 trials indicated that the groups differed with
 
regard to their average deviation from the initial
 
performance measure (NC Group deviation M = 1.79 vs PC Group
 
deviation M =9.48).
 
To further examine the conditioned stimulus acquisition
 
of causal strength, using a less descriptive strategy, a
 
simple repeated measures ANOVA was performed on subjects'
 
causal ratings across 9 trials. Similar to learning
 
research, the PC Group evidenced a gradual learning curve of
 
causal strength. The simple repeated measures ANOVA
 
performed on the subjects' causal judgments revealed a
 
significant acquisition effect, F (8, 152) - 2.36, p_. <
 
.02. As expected, the NC Group did not evidence an
 
acquisition effect despite receiving the same number of
 
worker-productivity pairings as subjects in the PC Group.
 
Contingency
 
Drawing from contemporary learning research, we
 
predicted that social causal judgments are not simply a
 
function of covariation, but are influenced by contextual
 
conditions. In particular, conditioned and unconditioned
 
stimulus pairings (i.e., Joe/company productivity) were
 
presented an equal number of times in each group where the
 
additional contextual information provided was varied. A
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Figure 2
 
ACauisition Curves of Causal Judgments for the Noncontingent:
 
CNCV Group and the Positive contingency fPC) Group
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2 X 9 (Groups X Trials) repeated measures ANOVA revealed
 
significant Group differences, F (1,38) = 9.29 e< .004, and
 
significant Group by Trial effect F (1,38) = 2.27 p < .02.
 
As expected, the PC and NC Groups differed significantly in
 
causal strength ratings (see Figure 2).
 
Although the Groups began similarly, differences
 
between means increased and then maximized with continued
 
training. Specifically, selected pairwise comparisons
 
revealed that on Trial 1 the two groups did not differ
 
significantly with regard to the strength of their causal
 
judgments, t (corrected df = 220) = 1.88, p > .05. However,
 
with experience, significant differences were observed
 
between the NC and PC Groups (e.g.. Trial 6,^t(corrected df
 
= 220) = 2.61, p < .05; Trial 7, t(220) = 2.40, p < .05;
 
Trial 8, t(220) = 4.16, p < .05; Trial 9, t(220) == 3.44. p <
 
.,05.),.
 
Confidence '
 
Given the importance of the primary measure, causal
 
judgment strength or strength of "invariance seeking
 
action," it was important to determine that the results were
 
hot an artifact of the conditioning procedure. In
 
particular, we wanted to eliminate an alternative
 
explanation that conditioned causal judgment strength
 
ratings differed as a result of the subjects' confidence in
 
their judgments. Drawing from contempofary learning
 
research (e.g.. Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) subjects were
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asked to rate their confidence in their causality judgment
 
on each conditioning trial. A 2 X 9 (Groups X Trials)
 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that neither the Groups
 
effect nor the interaction were statistically reliable,
 
suggesting that subjects' confidence was not confounded with
 
the conditioning treatment. As expected, the trials effect
 
was significant F (8, 304) = 2.19, p < .02; that is, with
 
increasing experience, the subjects' confidence in their
 
causal judgments predictably increased across trials (see
 
Figure 3).
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Figure 3
 
AcCfuisition Curve of Confidence Ratings
 
® 70
 
T3
 
69
 
Q
 
68
 
D)
 
a: 67
 
66
 
65
 
64
 
Trials
 
36
 
DISCUSSION
 
The goal of the present study was to use modern
 
conditioning theory to examine processes underlying human
 
judgments of causality. The present study is part of a
 
larger program of research designed to extend previous
 
work in causal attribution, and as such will not only
 
overlap current thinking in social psychology but can
 
eventually contribute novel explanations and predictions
 
for familiar and unfamiliar results. The causal
 
attribution research described in the literature, although
 
clearly sophisticated, does not yet contain a systematic
 
foundation for predicting and explaining social
 
attributions in context. It was our intention to extend
 
attribution theory, which has primarily focused on a
 
simple contiguity mechanism, to include those additional
 
principles which guide contemporary associative learning.
 
Contingency effects, in learning psychology, have not
 
eliminated the explanatpiry power of contiguity but have
 
indicated that the contiguity explanation of relationship
 
(cause/effect) results is not sufficient for explaining
 
those results. Attribution theory can be extended by
 
testing specific predictions about how causal attributions
 
acquire strength over repeated presentations of relevant
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information. And, by specifying group differences based
 
upon different cause and effect (CS/US) contingencies.
 
Further, the associative tradition in philosophy
 
views conditioning not as a low-level mechanical process
 
in which the control over a response is passed from one
 
stimulus to another, but instead, as the learning that
 
results from exposure to relations among events in the
 
environment. Given this distinction between historical
 
models of conditioning and contemporary learning theory,
 
hypotheses analogous to those developed by modern
 
conditioning researchers were tested. More specifically,
 
we generated hypotheses to test acquisition effects and
 
contingency effects in social attribution.
 
Acquisition Effects
 
The hypotheses were tested by pairing a worker (CS)
 
and a company's productivity information (US) an equal
 
number of times across four groups. Although all groups
 
experienced equal contiguity of the CS and the US, they
 
differed with regard to the baserate of the productivity
 
information provided (US) in the worker's absence.
 
According to the simple contiguity model, where context is
 
not an issue, all groups should have demonstrated equal
 
levels of causal judgment strength to the worker.
 
In contrast to simple contiguity model, we predicted
 
that acquisition was a function of CS/US contingency. In
 
particular, we expected that estimates of the worker as a
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cause of the company productivity would progressively
 
strengthen across trials in the PC Group, and in Groups 2
 
and 3 where the probability of the occurrence of the US
 
without the OS increased, we expected lower levels of
 
acquisition. In the NC Group, the company was equally
 
likely to meet its productivity level whether or not the
 
worker was present. The worker, Joe, therefore, provided
 
no additional information and no acquisition effects were
 
predicted. In general, support for the acquisition
 
hypothesis was found.
 
As predicted, the PC Group evidenced acquisition
 
effects and no conditioning occurred in the NC Group,
 
That is, subjects made the strongest causal attributions
 
when there was no legitimate alternative to the worker.
 
In Groups 2 and 3, however, where results were expected to
 
be intermediate between the extreme Groups (PC and NC),
 
subjects responded similar to the NC Group. The results
 
for Groups 2 and 3 were contrary to our predictions and
 
also inconsistent with previous research which examined
 
contingency effects using intermediate groups (Shanks &
 
Dickinson, 1987). It should be noted, however, that
 
Shanks and Dickinson, in contrast to the present study,
 
did not measure causal judgmeht regarding human action.
 
Arguably, the group differences reported above are
 
not at variance with Kelley's covariation principle.
 
However, the specificity regarding the acquisition of
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 causal judgment strength is only obtainable from
 
- ■ ■ ■ ) 
contemporary learning theory and serves to extend previous
 
work in causal attribution. Current social theory does
 
not contain a mechanism for predicting the form (e.g.,
 
additive or multiplicative) of acquisition of causal
 
judgment strength. For example, simply saying that causal
 
attributions get stronger as more information is made
 
available is not sufficient to describe the results
 
observed in the present research. Rather, the causal
 
judgments measured in the present study follow a form
 
frequently observed in learning psychology. That is, the
 
judgment strength started at a relatively low level and
 
progressively increased in strength until an asymptotic
 
level of causal judgment strength was reached-

One possible explanation for the results is that any
 
productivity which occurred in the worker's absence
 
undermined his causal status, suggesting that in human
 
conditioning there may be an "all or none" mechanism. We
 
could speculate that in human causal judgments the role of
 
the background (productivity information without Joe
 
present) can serve to diminish the causal priority of the
 
worker. This is especially true when the "social effect
 
or outcome" was defined as "company productivity" rather
 
than individual productivity. As a result, narrowing the
 
effect level of analysis closer to the worker might
 
increase the likelihood of finding intermediate effects.
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This post hoc explanation requires further research.
 
However, the higher ratings in the PC Group may argue
 
against the necessity of using an effect more
 
representative of the individual worker.
 
Further, an inspection of Figure 1 indicates that
 
subjects, unexpectedly, started out at a relatively high
 
level of causal strength (M = 64.88). Theoretically,
 
beginning at a lower level of causal strength would have
 
enhanced the acquisition effect, defined as amount of
 
change across conditioning trials. A possible explanation
 
for the higher initial ratings is that subjects had
 
information about a hypothetical "productivity goal" (See
 
appendix D). The level of production reported each month
 
exceeded the arbitrary goal, therefore a certain amount of
 
productivity success could be inferred. As a result,
 
judgments of causality and therefore acquisition of cause
 
did not begin at "floor" level. In future research it is
 
proposed that the arbitrary goal be eliminated.
 
Continaencv Effects
 
Contingency effects hypotheses were tested by holding
 
the frequency of the worker and company information
 
provided constant across experimental groups and comparing
 
strength of causal judgments between groups when the
 
baserate of productivity information in Joe's absence was
 
varied. Hence, across groups subjects received the same
 
information about the worker and his level of productivity
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(simple contiguity) but received this information in
 
different stimulus contexts. Consistent with contemporary
 
learning research (e.g.. Shanks & Dickinson, 1987), the
 
causal priority given to the worker for the observed
 
effect was expected to differ as a function of the context
 
in which the pairing of the worker and the company meeting
 
it's goal took place. That is, we expected a negative
 
relationship between the number of times the company goal
 
was met in the worker's absence and the strength of the
 
subject's causal judgments. Theoretically, a simple
 
contiguity-sensitive process should have yielded similar
 
causal judgments across the four groups, however, the
 
results of the present research indicated that evaluations
 
of the worker as an effective "cause" decreased as the
 
baserate of the company meeting the goal in the worker's
 
absence increased.
 
A simple-contiguity sensitive mechanism could not
 
distinguish pairings in which the cause, in this case the
 
worker, was necessary for the social outcome or "effect"
 
from those in which the conjunction was accidental. One
 
possible explanation for the differences between the NC
 
and PC Groups, in particular, is that in the NO Group
 
there was a potential source of causal agents for the
 
outcome (productivity goal) other than the target cause
 
(the worker) under consideration. This source can be
 
defined as the causal background which includes all
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plausible causal agents other than the target. Recall
 
that what distinguished the NC and PC Grpups was that the
 
outcome (productivity level) was systematically paired
 
with the causal background on those trials where the
 
worker was absent in the NC Group, but not in the PC
 
Group. Hence, the reduction in the worker's causal
 
strength ratings in the NC Group may be the result of the
 
background stimuli attenuating or blocking attributions to
 
the worker.
 
The explanatory'and predictive power of the
 
contingency mechanism would have been strengthened had the
 
middle level groups proved to be reliably different from
 
each other and from the "extreme" conditions represented
 
by the NC and PC Groups. Nevertheless, the results did
 
support the expectation that causal judgments must be
 
understood in terms of the context in which cause and
 
effect are presented. From the contingency point of view,
 
a subject's causal judgments do not require that causes
 
and effects be mutually present and mutually absent.
 
Associations develop because the CS and US are
 
systematically paired. Hence, causal judgments develop
 
because a cause and effect are systematically paired. The
 
strength of associations do not require the subject to
 
receive additional information that "no CS" is followed by
 
"no US." Hence, from a learning view point causal
 
judgments do not require the subject to receive
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information that "no cause" preceded "no effect". Rather,
 
effects are assumed to be present otherwise the invariance
 
seeking action would not be initiated. There are no
 
causal attributions in the absence of an effect. The
 
contingency mechanism makes this assumption perfectly
 
clear in its definition of positive, negative, and zero
 
contingency.
 
The present research underscores the importance of
 
the "causal environment" with regard to attributions in
 
the work place. Consistent with our research, Japanese
 
principles of management (e.g., Deming Model) suggest that
 
performance appraisals can be confounded by the context,
 
or "system" within which the individual works. In
 
traditional employee evaluations, however, context effects
 
are not usually a consideration and as a result may lead
 
to erroneous conclusions regarding the worker's overall
 
effectiveness. Recall that the worker's performance in
 
the present study did not vary across experimental groups.
 
However, the "supervisors" rated the worker as less
 
effective when company productivity information was
 
provided in his absence compared to the worker who was
 
evaluated in a context which did not include additional
 
productivity information.
 
Confidence Ratings
 
Theoretically, group differences in the subjects'
 
causal judgments were expected to be the result of
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experimental manipulations effecting the associative
 
process, not the result of increases or decreases in
 
confidence in making the judgments themselves. To
 
determine that subjects' causality judgments were not
 
confounded by their confidence in their judgments,
 
subjects were asked to rate their confidence in their
 
judgments using a 0 to 100 point scale. Consistent with a
 
priori predictions, confidence ratings increased across
 
the evaluation trials, indicating increased confidence
 
resulting from experience, but the confidence ratings did
 
not differ between the NC and PC Groups. Subjects were
 
not confused, rather they responded in a predictable
 
manner, making orderly judgments, to the stimuli
 
presented. This outcome is consistent with confidence
 
ratings reported by Shanks and Dickinson (1987), and
 
provides additional support for the associative learning
 
model of causal judgment strength.
 
Limitations on Reported Effects
 
The results, like the results from any theory-

generated research program, should be interpreted within a
 
narrow range of conditions (Logan, 1959). In fact, the
 
method used here serves as an explicit statement of some
 
of the boundary conditions, particularly in regard to the
 
discrete trials procedure. In social psychology,
 
investigations regarding strength of causal judgments
 
frequently use descriptions of social action rather than
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presenting information about behavior over time. That is,
 
subjects are frequently asked to make an attribution based
 
on information from a single observation. The present
 
study, because it used analogies of a familiar learning
 
paradigm, involved multiple presentations of the stimuli.
 
Although Kelley's covariation principle pertains to
 
attributions resulting from multiple observations, the
 
context effects reported here, using the short delay
 
conditioning paradigm, may generalize only to situations
 
where information is presented repeatedly rather than
 
merely described. However, this caution may be too
 
pessimistic. Conditioning analogies from both
 
instrumental and Pavlovian learning models have
 
successfully been used to study a variety of social
 
phenomena: attraction (Clore & Bryne, 1974; Cramer,
 
Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985); competition
 
(Steigleder, Weiss, Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978); altruism
 
(Weiss, Buchanan, Altstatt, & Lombardo, 1971); and male
 
sex-role action (Cramer, Lutz, Bartell, Dragna, & Helzer,
 
1989).
 
In addition to the limitations described above (e.g.,
 
arbitrary goal, definition of US, multiple observations),
 
the "part-time" status Of the worker may also have
 
influenced subjects' causal strength ratings. For
 
example, in the experimental groups where additional
 
company productivity information was provided in the
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worker's absence, subjects may have rated the worker as a
 
less effective cause of the company's productivity because
 
he was not employed full-time. This procedural constraint
 
was necessary to explain the control trial information
 
indicating when "No Report" was required, and served to
 
equate the number of trials received by all of the
 
subjects. It should be noted, however, that the worker was
 
referred to as a part-time employee in all of the
 
experimental groups, including the PC Group.
 
Implications for Future Research
 
The present study focused on the subjects' strength
 
of causality judgments to one specific employee. Because
 
of the trend toward forming small groups of employees or
 
teams, future research is warranted when several employees
 
are working together and being evaluated. Recall that the
 
discounting mechanism in causal attribution noted above
 
suggested that the priority of a given cause in producing
 
an effect is attenuated if other plausible causes are
 
present (Kelley, 1972). Hence, causal judgments to two or
 
more workers paired with productivity information is
 
expected to be attenuated relative to the causal judgment
 
strength reported in the present study, where a single
 
worker was evaluated. Naive scientist explanations of the
 
discounting effect notwithstanding, analogies drawn from
 
contemporary associative learning variables can be used to
 
predict and explain the attenuation of causal judgment
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strength when multiple plausible causes are present.
 
In Pavlovian learning conditioned responding is said
 
to be influenced by the intensity of the US, and the
 
intensity is said to represent a theoretical limit on the
 
extent the US can influence responding. For example, if
 
two CS's are conditioned individually, conditioned
 
responding to each stimulus should approach the
 
theoretical limit supportable by the US used in the
 
conditioning situation. However, if the same two CS's are
 
presented in a stimulus compound and paired with the US,
 
conditioned responding to the individual stimuli is
 
expected to be approximately one half the strength
 
observed resulting from single stimulus conditioning.
 
Consistent with the principles guiding associative
 
learning, we could predict that estimates of an individual
 
employee (CS analog) being the cause of a company meetings
 
it productivity goal (US analog) will weaken when he is
 
evaluated with other team members (compound CS analog)
 
present. In contrast, this discounting effect or loss in
 
causal judgment strength to the individual worker is
 
expected to be reversed if, after the addition of co­
workers, there is an increase in the company's
 
productivity level. This prediction follows from the
 
Pavlovian expectation that elevations in US intensity
 
increase conditioned responding to a relevant CS. In
 
terms of causal attributions to the worker, increases in
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production level will increase causal attribution strength
 
despite the presence of team members. That is, an
 
increase in causal judgment strength to the worker will
 
evidence an "undiscounting effect." The test of these
 
predictions awaits future research.
 
Clinical Implications
 
In addition to the social areas described above
 
(attraction, competition, altruism, male sex-role action)
 
causal judgments also play a fundamental role in clinical
 
psychology (e.g., Seligman, 1975). Therapists observe
 
potential causes and their effects occurring across a
 
period of time or what Bertrand Russell termed, "knowledge
 
by acquaintance" on a regular basis (see Shanks, 1991).
 
For example, clients often manifest their developmental
 
conflicts in therapy and are adept at eliciting and
 
engaging therapists in their conflicts. These conflicts
 
can be resolved, however, when the therapist's response
 
reoeatedlv disconfirms their pathogenic developmental
 
experiences (simple contiguity). As a result of this
 
"corrective emotional experience," clients discover that
 
it is safe to act in new and more adaptive ways (see
 
Teyber, 1992). Learning is not usually complete until
 
after several pairings of the cause and effect have been
 
experienced (acquisition). In particular, a therapist may
 
view a client's lack of progress as "resistance," rather
 
than acknowledging that an insufficient number of
 
49
 
"learning trials" has occurred.
 
The Industrial-Organizational paradigm used in the
 
present study provides mundane realism for our
 
experimental situation (i.e., supervisor-worker
 
evaluations). However, it would be more difficult to use
 
a clinician-client paradigm because it would require that
 
the subject take on the role of a therapist. The
 
advantages for expanding the external validity of the
 
present results using a clinician-client paradigm cannot
 
be over estimated. For example, we could postulate that
 
clinical assessments of a client (attributions of cause)
 
who attends group therapy, in comparison to the client who
 
attends individual therapy, may be more subject to the
 
"context effects" described abdve.
 
Specifically, in the context of group therapy,
 
attributions regarding a client's behavior (internally
 
based causes), in particular, those behaviors which
 
represent completion of treatment goals and objectives
 
(outcome), may be influenced by context effects. In other
 
words, causal judgments of a client's behavior reliably
 
signaling treatment goal completions is expected to more
 
salient in individual counseling than in group therapy.
 
In individual therapy the "to be explained effects"
 
(treatment goal completions) are only present when the
 
client is present. The clinician's attributions regarding
 
the cause of the effects should be the strongest in this
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case. However, in group therapy it is possible that the
 
"effect" could be observed in the presence of other group
 
members, but if the client is not in attendance, also in
 
the client's absence. Such a context is expected to
 
produce weaker invariance seeking actions to the client.
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APPENDIX A
 
Instructions for all Experimental Groups
 
Preliminary Instructions. In this study we are interested
 
in testing a computerized employee evaluation system.
 
Your cooperation is necessary for testing the usefulness
 
of this automated program. In order to carefully test the
 
effectiveness of the system, you will need to assume the
 
role of a supervisor in a large company. You will be
 
given information about a part-time employee, Joe and his
 
company's level of productivity. After reviewing a
 
monthly productivity report, it will be your
 
responsibility as Joe's supervisor to evaluate his
 
performance and how effective he was in causing the
 
company's level of productivity. Joe is a college student
 
who is available only for part-time employment. Therefore
 
he will not be present during each rating cycle. But it
 
is important to evaluate Joe carefully each month because
 
he will be considered for full time employment upon
 
graduation.
 
Instructions Prior to Practice Trial. On the left side of
 
the screen a picture representing a part-time employee,
 
Joe, will be presented. A blank screen will appear during
 
an evaluation cycle if Joe had not been called in to work.
 
On the right side of the screen a graph depicting the
 
company's monthly productivity goal and the level of
 
monthly productivity will be presented. During an
 
evaluation cycle it is possible a blank screen would
 
appear for a month where no report was submitted. Two
 
blank screens may appear if Joe was not called in to work
 
and a monthly report was not submitted.
 
Instructions Prior to Estimates of Causal Strength.
 
Following each monthly productivity report you will be
 
asked to answer five items on a '0 - 100' point scale.
 
After reading the item carefully, please respond by using
 
the numeric key pad on the right side of the keyboard.
 
After entering your '0 - 100' response, please wait for
 
the next evaluation item to appear.
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APPENDIX B
 
CONSENT FORM
 
I am volunteering to participate as a subject in this
 
study. I understand that the purpose of this study is to
 
test the efficiency of a computerized employee evaluation
 
system. I understand that the information will be
 
presented via a computer monitor and that I will be asked
 
to assume the role of a production supervisor in a large
 
company. I understand that my name will NOT be included
 
in the experiment itself and that my anonymity will be
 
maintained at all times. I also understand that my
 
participation in this study is voluntary and that I may
 
refuse to answer any questions at any time. I also
 
understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time
 
without penalty or prejudice. I also understand that any
 
questions I may have regarding this study will be
 
answered.
 
I understand that all the information collected in this
 
study will be treated as confidential with no details
 
about my responses released to anyone outside the research
 
staff without my separate and specific written consent. I
 
understand that I may derive no specific benefit from
 
participation in this study, except perhaps from knowing
 
that I have contributed to the development of
 
psychological knowledge.
 
I hereby allow this research group to publish the results
 
of this study in which I am Participating, with the
 
provision that my name and/or other identifying
 
information be withheld. This study is being conducted by
 
psychology students under the supervision of Dr. Robert
 
Cramer, PS-211, extension 5576. I understand that if I
 
have any questions or concerns about the study or the
 
informed consent process I may also contact the Psychology
 
Department Human Subjects Review Board at CSUSB.
 
Participant's Signature: '
 
Participant's Name (Printed):
 
Date: ■ 
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APPENDIX C
 
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT
 
The present study is part of a series of research
 
projects designed to investigate human social causal
 
judgments. Unfortunately, in order to adequately
 
investigate this social phenomenon a small deception of
 
the subjects,was necessary- Rather than directly asking
 
questions concerning your social causal judgments, we
 
explained the study as testing the efficiency of a
 
computerized Employee Evaluation System. The company, its
 
employees, and the evaluation system were fictitious. We
 
apologize for this deception, however, if we had asked
 
directly about your causal judgments your responses may
 
have been effected.
 
(Stop. Are there any questions?)
 
It is our sincere hope that the necessity for
 
deception is understood. It is important for the
 
completion of this study that you do not speak with other
 
students on campus about your experiences here today. If
 
other potential subjects are aware of the purpose of the
 
experiment, the results of the study might be compromised.
 
The present study conforms to the ethical principles
 
established by the American Psychological Association. We
 
are interested in obtaining your comments or reaction
 
regarding your participation in our experiment. This
 
information would serve as a basis for checking and
 
evaluating the quality and care with which our research is
 
conducted. Please feel free to comment or ask questions.
 
For results concerning the present study contact Dr.
 
Robert Cramer, (714) 880-5576.
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 APPENDIX D
 
CS/US Acauisj-tion Trial
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 Appendix D (cont'd)
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